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In recent years, issues surrounding the use and abuse of trans-
fer pricing1 have received a great deal of attention.2 The United
* Attorney in the Office of General Counsel at the Export-Import Bank of the United
States and a member of the Wisconsin and Pennsylvania Bars. Mr. Hendrix holds an M.A.
in Ibero-American Studies and a J.D. in Law, both from the University of Wisconsin. The
author would like to thank Professor Charles Irish, Col. Val E. Hendrix, Julia R. Hendrix,
and Rona Morrow for their help and assistance with this article. Opinions expressed are
only those of the author and are not the opinions of any other entity or person.
1. A transfer price is defined as the price used for internal sales of goods and services
between the divisions of a business enterprise. Rugman & Eden, Introduction, in MULTINA-
TIONALS AND TRANSFER PRICING 1 (Rugman & Eden eds. 1985) [hereinafter
MULTINATIONALS).
2. The area of law addressed in this article is rapidly developing. A new government
has been elected in Ecuador and will be confronting many of the problems discussed in this
investigation. This article reflects information available up to February 1989. However, the
reader is advised that the law cited is in a process of change. Therefore, if specific questions
should arise in practice, it often may be necessary to consult with legal or accounting repre-
sentatives in the appropriate country.
For a general survey of current issues, see R. ECCLES, THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM
(1985); R. MARTINEZ, Los PRECIOS DE TRANSFERENCIA EN LA PLANIFICACION IMPRESARIAL
(1981); Aud & Wright, Intercorporate Transfer Pricing and Puerto Rico, Revisited: A Com-
ment, 12 INT'L TAX J. 43-48 (1986); Bohman & Bohman, Transfer Pricing under the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 - Sections 482 and 1059A, 14 INT'L TAX J. 83-90 (1988); Casey, Inter-
national Transfer Pricing, 67 MGMT. AccT. Oct. 1985, at 31; Coburn, Ellis & Milano, Dilem-
mas in MNC Transfer Pricing, 63 MGMT. AccT., Nov. 1981, at 53; Dekker, The Netherlands:
Transfer Pricing, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 502 (1986); Eccles, Control
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States has given its Internal Revenue Service the discretion to cor-
rect abuses in deductions, credits and income distribution between
two related entities.$ Other nations have their own mechanisms for
controlling abuse.
This article will examine how Ecuador, one of the less econom-
ically developed Latin American nations, handles transfer pricing
in comparison with how Argentina, a more economically advanced
state, deals with the same issues. Based on the lessons learned
from the Argentine model, improvements will be suggested to the
Ecuadorian system. However, a number of definitions and concepts
should first be addressed.
A. Definitions of Transfer Pricing and its Abuse
Transfer pricing is a transaction in which the normal market
forces do not determine the price paid by a buyer to a seller for a
particular good, service, or technology. Instead, the price is estab-
lished at the seller's discretion.4 Transfer pricing occurs when two
with Fairness in Transfer Pricing, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov-Dec. 1983, at 149-61; Finn &
Munter, The Importance of Transfer Pricing to Oil and Gas Companies, 35 OIL & GAS TAX
Q., Sept. 1986, at 136-47; Fisher, I.R.C. Sec. 482 - Applying the Arm's Length Standard to
Transactions Between Foreign Car Manufacturers and Their United States Subsidiaries, 4
WisC. INT'L L.J. 134-61 (1985); Goldsmith, Summary of Rules Applicable to Transfer Pric-
ing in France, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 564-68 (1986); Gordon & Dono-
hue, Tax Reform Act of 1986: Transfer Prices for Imported Merchandise, 35 CANADIAN TAx
J. 1543-46 (1987); Granwell, Hirsh & Milton, Worldwide Unitary Tax: Is It Valid Under
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation?, L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 695 (1986);
Greenhill & Herbolzheimer, International Transfer Pricing: The Restrictive Business Prac-
tices Approach, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 232-41 (1980); Hongskrailers & Jap, Thailand:
Transfer Pricing Provisions, Rulings and Case Law, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTA-
TION 514 (1986); Jensen, Transfer-Pricing and Output Decisions: The Dynamic Interaction,
17 DECISION SCIENCES 428 (1986); Keegan & Howard, Making Transfer Pricing Work for
Services, 165 J. ACCOUNTANCY, MAR. 1988, at 96; Lanthier, Canada: Draft Guidelines on
International Transfer Pricing, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 487 (1986); Raf-
ferty, The Profit-Split Method of Income Allocation in Intercompany Pricing Disputes:
The Eli Lilly Case, 64 TAXES 662 (1986); Schindler, Intercorporate Transfer Pricing, 19
TAX ADVISER, May 1988, at 378; Schindler, U.S.A.: Taxation of Intercorporate Transfer
Pricing - A Management Responsibility, 40 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 497
(1986); Terbrueggen, Can a Central Cash Pool Work for Transfer Pricing?, 68 MGMT. Ac-
COUNTANT, July 1986, at 31; Wheeler, An Academic Look at Transfer Pricing in a Global
Economy, 40 TAX NOTES 87-96 (1988); Yoost, Watanabe & Fox-Moore, Japan: The New
Inter-Company Pricing Rules, 40 BULL. INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 506 (1986); Gutfeld,
IRS Plans to Toughen Rules for Taxing Transfer Among Firms, Overseas Units, Wall St.
J., Oct. 20, 1988, at C1S.
3. I.R.C. § 482 (1988). See also 5 D. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 54-55 (2d ed. 1984).
4. Irish, Transfer Pricing Abuses and Less Developed Countries 2 (1985) (unpublished
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related parties, often a parent company and its subsidiary, engage
in a transaction.'
Transfer pricing abuse is more difficult to define,' because
transfer prices are not easy to determine, even when they are set in
an honest manner.7 An abuse is said to occur when the price falls
outside the normal expectation for the expense.8 However, it is
rare to find a single, expected price.9 In fact, it is probably more
accurate to speak of an acceptable range of normal transfer
prices. 10 This latitude makes detection of abuse less accurate and
more complex. A brief description of the ways in which transfer
price abuse produces financial rewards may aid in further defining
the scope of the problem.
B. How Transfer Pricing Can Be Used
There are basically three reasons why firms engage in transfer
pricing abuse. First, transfer pricing allows companies to circum-
vent restrictions on repatriation of income and currency conver-
sion.1 Second, transfer pricing may be used to ". . . quietly with-
draw profits in the face of economic uncertainties in host countries
or in any instance in which business considerations dictate showing
low profits in a particular jurisdiction."' 2 This inquiry focuses pri-
manuscript) (available at offices of INTER-AM. L. REV.).
5. C. KORTH, INTERNATIONAL BusiNZss: ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT 562 (1985).
6. New Tune for Corporate Tax Fiddlers, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1981, at 108-09 [herein-
after Fiddlers].
7. McGuinnes, Comments on the Difficulties in Regulating Transfer Prices, in MuL-
TINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 309.
8. Van Hoorn, Problems, Possibilities and Limitations with Respect to Measures
Against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 763 (1978).
9. C. KORTH, supra note 5, at 505.
10. Irish, supra note 4, at 3. For a comprehensive, yet concise chart depicting the com-
plexity of establishing a transfer price, see R. ECCLES, supra note 2, at 29.
11. C. KORTH, supra note 5, at 505. Before oil price deregulation, United States oil
firms tried to skirt Department of Energy restrictions by using transfer prices. Fiddlers,
supra note 6, at 108-09. See also R. TANG, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN 79-98 (1979) (discussing the objectives for using transfer pricing).
12. Irish, supra note 4, at 8. For a discussion of other motives for transfer pricing, see
Drumm, Transfer Pricing in the International Firm, 23 MGMT. INT'L REV. No. 4, 32-33, 38-
42 (1983); Kassicieh, International Intra-Company Transfer Pricing, 29 OPERATIONS RES.,
July-Aug. 1981, at 817, 819-27. For a summary of data on the relative importance of transfer
price objectives, see Yunker, A Survey Study of Subsidiary Autonomy, Performance Evalu-
ation and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporations, 18 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Fall
1983, at 51, 58-59. For an outline of alternative transfer price methods, see Grosse, Finan-




marily on the third purpose of transfer pricing abuse: tax evasion.
In this context, abuse occurs where a taxpayer takes an aggressive
position in setting the transfer price in order to avoid taxation.
The following scenario illustrates the use of transfer pricing to
evade or lower taxes.13
Suppose a parent company with two subsidiaries is located in
a high-tax jurisdiction. Subsidiary I is located in a moderate-tax
jurisdiction, while Subsidiary II is located in a low-tax jurisdiction
(a so-called "tax haven"). If the parent has a product it wishes to
sell to Subsidiary I's country, barring any tax restrictions, the par-
ent may work out the following transfer price scheme to drastically
lower its tax liability. If the product costs fifty cents to produce
and the parent wishes to sell the product for one dollar, it could
simply sell the product to Subsidiary I, and realize a fifty-cent
profit, on which it would pay tax accordingly. However, a more
complex transaction could lower the parent's tax liability. The par-
ent could sell the product to Subsidiary II for fifty cents and real-
ize no profit in its own high tax jurisdiction. Subsidiary II could
then re-sell the product for one dollar to Subsidiary I, and realize a
fifty-cent profit in that low-tax jurisdiction. Subsidiary I could
then re-sell the product locally, and realize no profit at all. The
savings to the entire corporation (parent and subsidiaries) under
this scenario is equal to the difference in tax between the high- and
low-tax jurisdictions. Corporations have learned to use this scheme
to their advantage whenever possible."'
C. Determining the General Frequency of Transfer Pricing
Abuse
Not a great deal of research has been done to ascertain the
parameters and frequency of abuse.15 Any statistics that do exist
with regard to transfer pricing abuse are suspect, because the
figures in corporate accounts on which taxes are based and which
form the basis for any dispute between the tax authority and the
company bear little resemblance to the final settlement created by
13. For more detailed examples, see R. BARNET & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE
POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 157-59 (1974) (hereinafter GLOBAL REACH].
14. Id. at 277-82.
15. S. PLASSCHAERT, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 11-12 (1979);
Lall, Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries, 7 WORLD DEV. 59, 60 (1979); Lecraw,
Some Evidence on Transfer Pricing by Multinational Corporations, in MULTINATIONALS,
supra note 1, at 223, 229.
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the tax authority. 16 Moreover, given that much international trade
takes place between related parties, there remains great opportu-
nity for abuse.17 One study estimated that one-third of all parent
company exports went to related firms. 8 United States related-
party imports in the third world are estimated at 43.4% of total
imports.' In the petroleum industry, the figure climbs to 59.6% of
total imports.20 In the area of royalties, licensing fees, and techni-
cal assistance, with regard to parent companies located in Great
Britain and the United States, the figure for intra-company trade
can climb to as high as eighty to eighty-five percent of the total
revenue received by the parent."
Further, data reveals that "very high proportions of some
United States imports from developing countries originate with re-
lated parties; there are frequently large differences between import
unit values in related-party trade and those in non-related-party
trade. ' '22 Investigation reveals that export tax increases in the
1970s led multinationals to justify increased market prices in the
United States, while retaining a constant nominal purchase price
for bananas in Central America.2 Thus, while total tax revenue
increased, the countries received only a portion of the taxable in-
crease in revenue due to the government because of pricing
schemes by multinational enterprises.2 4 Similarly, copper market-
ing companies in Zambia have been able to deprive partially na-
tionally-owned operating companies of profit, transferring the
money to tax havens.25 Another study has found that from one to
16. Fiddlers, supra note 6, at 108. For a discussion on how eventual settlements may
have little relation to legal mandates, see also S. Hendrix, Is What You See What You Get?:
Perspectives on Post-Verdict Bargaining, (Fall 1985) (unpublished seminar paper given at a
seminar on Disputes Processing, at the Univ. of Wisconsin) (available at the offices of IN-
TER-AM. L. REV.).
17. Irish, supra note 4, at 4
18. U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORTxONS IN
WORLD DEVELOPMENT - THIRD SURVEY 1983, at 160, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.II.A.14 (1983) [hereinafter THIRD SURVEY].
19. Helleiner, Intra-Firm Trade and the Developing Countries: An Assessment of the
Data, in MULTINATIONALS BEYOND THE MARKET 31, 46 (Murray ed. 1981) [hereinafter BE-
YOND THE MARKET].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 120.
22. Id. at 54.
23. Ellis, Export Valuation and Intra-Firm Transfers in the Banana Export Industry
in Central America, in BEYOND THE MARKET, supra note 19, at 61-75.
24. Id. at 73-74.
25. Lamaswala, The Pricing of Unwrought Copper In Relation To Transfer Pricing, in
BEYOND THE MARKET, supra note 19, at 77, 84-85.
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nineteen percent under-invoicing of Greek aluminum resulted in a
loss of more than $4 million in government revenue in 1976 alone.2"
In Brazil, a number of abuses have been reported in firms, includ-
ing Yamaha Musical do Brazil (a subsidiary of Nippon Gakki
Company), Ericsson (a telecommunications firm), and Cargill (a
firm in the grain sector)." Recent data for Brazil also shows that
multinational entities paid twenty-one to thirty-nine percent
higher import prices in sample areas.28 In addition, not only were
prices higher, on the average, in multinational firms, but the prices
also displayed greater variability.29 Furthermore, widespread liter-
ature on the manipulation of transfer prices available to multina-
tional corporations 0 suggests that abuse by that sector may be
common.
3 1
D. Frequency of Abuse in Ecuador and Argentina
There is not a great deal of information available on the de-
gree of transfer pricing abuse in Ecuador and Argentina. However,
some limited data for Argentina is available. In 1976, entities affili-
ated with companies based in the Federal Republic of Germany
which had operations in India, Mexico, Argentina and Brazil,
transacted approximately sixty percent of their sales with related
entities abroad.3 2 This would suggest that the opportunity for
abuse exists. In fact, one study in Argentina found that over-in-
voicing did occur in the pharmaceutical industry.33 Subsidiaries of
foreign entities which sold drugs in eight different therapeutic
groups charged 143 to 700% more than the price for which the
same products could have been purchased from other sources.34
26. Roumeliotis, Underinvoicing Aluminum From Greece, in BEYOND THE MARKET,
supra note 19, at 86.
27. Greenhill & Herbolzheimer, supra note 2, at 238 (citing U.N. CTAD, Annual Report
on Legislative and other Developments in Developed and Developing Countries in the
Control of Restrictive Business Practices at para. 163, U.N. Doc. TD/B/750 (1979)).
28. Natke, A Comparison of Import Pricing By Foreign and Domestic Firms in Brazil,
in MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 212, 220.
29. Id.
30. Irish, supra note 4, at 6. See, e.g., Charles, The Economics Approach to Transfer
Price, 96 ACCT., June 1985, at 110; Kassicieh, supra note 12, at 817-27.
31. M. GRUNDY, THE WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 15-22 (1984).
32. THIRD SURVEY, supra note 18, at 160.
33. U.N., TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OF DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES at 17, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/49, U.N. Sales No. 84.IIA.10 (1984) [hereinafter
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY).
34. Id. The Ecuadorian government feels it too may be the victim of over-invoicing in
the pharmaceutical industry. In 1988, the Central Bank discovered one company that had
[Vol. 20:2288
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Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that where an opportunity
for abuse exists, there may be a strong incentive to use transfer
pricing as a vehicle for tax evasion. Another study attempted to
measure the opportunity for abuse in Argentina by estimating in-
tra-firm payments as a percentage of total payments in 1972.35
That study found that in sample areas, forty-two percent of total
payments in Argentina were made between related entities. 6 That
same study went on to assert that although exact results comput-
ing the difference in price are difficult to reach, evidence of trans-
fer price abuse exists in Argentina. 7
There is no reason to believe that Ecuador's situation is very
different from Argentina's. An analysis of the general data for re-
lated-party transactions in the third world creates at least an infer-
ence of the potential existence of abuse in Ecuador. Further, the
lack of detailed and specific data for Argentina and Ecuador
should not be used as a reason to ignore what may in reality be or
become a serious area of abuse. Consequently, Argentina and Ec-
uador need controls to prevent undefensible transfer pricing. As
one scholar noted:
Since the volume of intra firm transactions is high worldwide,
and the incentives to engage in transfer pricing abuses are gen-
erally greater in the less developed countries than in the indus-
trialized countries, and the risk of detection usually is less in the
less developed countries than in the industrialized countries, it
also is logical to conclude that however great a problem transfer
pricing abuses are in industrialized countries, they are an even
greater problem in the less developed countries."
Thus, based on information available with respect to other juris-
dictions, as well as on information available for Ecuador and Ar-
gentina, it is likely that the absence of attention is, in fact, a sign
been charging Ecuadorian customers over twice the rate it was charging Colombian custom-
ers for identical products. Telephone interview with Juana Caicedo, Minister Counselor, Ec-
uadorian Government Trade Office, New York City (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Trade Of-
fice Interview].
35. Chudnovsky, Pricing of Intra-Firm Technological Transactions, in BEYOND THE
MARKET, supra note 19, at 119, 120.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Irish, supra note 4, at 7. See also Plasschaert, Transfer Pricing Problems In Devel-
oping Countries, in MULTINATIONALS, supra note 1, at 247. For a discussion of the view that
multinational corporations have no moral problems with abuse, see GLOBAL REACH, supra
note 13, at 187. President Rodrigo Borja has stated that transfer pricing poses great
problems for the Ecuadorians. Trade Office Interview, supra note 34.
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that transfer pricing abuse is a serious problem.
E. The Policies Involved in Transfer Price Control
Both Ecuador and Argentina must consider the likely impact
of implementing programs to control transfer pricing abuse. Be-
cause multinational corporations prefer more developed markets,39
a newly-developing country like Ecuador might be uncomfortable
adding controls which would discourage investment.' 0 Thus, Ecua-
dorian transfer pricing abuses may be tolerated or ignored by the
government because of the economic disadvantages associated with
curbing abuse. Multinationals provide many benefits to the emerg-
ing Ecuadorian market, including employment, foreign exchange,
and exports." Indeed, the Febres Cordero administration created a
substantial incentive program to attract multinationals and signifi-
cantly liberalized the actual implementation of investment guide-
lines from the Andean Pact to encourage investment.' 2 Foreign in-
vestment appeared to be on the rise in Ecuador, at least until the
new government of President Rodrigo Borja came to power in
1988."1 The present regime is concerned with balancing the goal of
eliminating or controlling transfer pricing abuse with the risk of
losing valuable foreign investment.
In implementing any programs aimed at countering abusive
pricing schemes, Ecuador must consider two factors." First, in or-
der to preserve legitimate multinational corporate interests, corpo-
rations must be allowed the discretion to set prices within a flexi-
ble range.' This is important because it establishes boundaries
39. THIRD SURVEY, supra note 18, at 17.
40. For a discussion of the difficulties of regulating abuse without discouraging invest-
ment, see GLOBAL REACH, supra note 13, at 207.
41. C. KORTH, supra note 5, at 275-302.
42. American Embassy Quito, 1986 Investment Climate Statement for Ecuador 1 (Sept.
23, 1986) (internal memorandum) [hereinafter Investment Climate] (available at offices of
INTER-AM. L. REV.).
43. Id. at 4. For examples of the "bad press" received by the new administration, see
President of Ecuador Terms Debt Unpayable, J. Commerce (Aug. 15, 1988); Robinson,
Anti-U.S. Mural Highlights Ecuadorian's Inauguration, Wash. Post, Aug. 11, 1988, at A23,
cols. 3-4. These articles suggest that investors rethink the idea of investing in Ecuador.
However, Ecuador is receiving some new investment from the Inter-American Development
Bank and the Andean Development Corporation. See Ecuador to Get $1 Billion for Devel-
opment Projects, J. Commerce (Feb. 10, 1989).
44. For a discussion of these two factors, see Irish, supra note 4, at 12-13.
45. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TRANSFER
PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 12 (1984) [hereinafter OECD/1984].
[Vol. 20:2
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within which a corporation can still use transfer pricing to reap a
reasonable profit. Moreover, setting prices, even in an honest man-
ner, can be a difficult task,46 while determining a range of accept-
able prices is more realistic and ascertainable. Second, to counter
the negative effects of increased regulatory control on the multina-
tionals which Ecuador wishes to keep in or attract to the country,
the nation may also wish to take measures to enhance its invest-
ment climate by creating an impression that the government is
merely streamlining the bureaucracy and cutting back on the insti-
tutional inefficiencies which create the opportunity for transfer
pricing abuse in the first place.' 7 Alternatively, Ecuador may wish
to use another system, like apportionment, which does not require
a complex calculation to determine a transfer price or range. A
careful consideration of these factors will enable the government to
curtail transfer pricing abuse without seriously injuring the invest-
ment climate.
Having laid out what transfer pricing is, how it occurs, its fre-
quency, and why it is a difficult subject for control, it is now appro-
priate to turn to the substantive law of Ecuador and Argentina to
examine how each of these nations counteracts the abuse.
II. How ARGENTINA PRESENTLY COPES WITH TRANSFER PRICING
AND ITS ABUSE
A. Summary of Argentina's Corporate Tax System as It Af-
fects Multinational Corporations
In Argentina, affiliated companies of foreign corporations are
taxed at the same rate as are domestic corporations.' 8 That rate is
thirty-three percent of total profits.'9 In addition, both foreign af-
filiates and domestic corporations must pay a 17.50% tax on non-
stock or profit dividends distributed to overseas beneficiaries, mak-
ing the effective tax rate about forty-five percent - a rate equal to
the highest individual marginal tax rate." Similarly, Argentine
branches of overseas companies pay forty-five percent on their
profits.5 1 However, for both the branch and the subsidiary of a for-
46. Irish, supra note 4, at 12-13.
47. Id.






eign corporation, home office expenses can be allocated to the local
office and used as a deduction if they "are necessary to obtain tax-
able income in Argentina."" An additional withholding tax of fif-
teen to twenty-five percent is due when remittance of profit net of
income tax exceeds twelve percent of the registered capital.5 3 Inter-
est is subject to a forty-five percent withholding tax on twenty-five
percent of the gross amount, yielding an effective rate of 11.25 per-
cent." Generally, royalties are subject to a forty-five percent with-
holding tax." Salaries, wages, and directors' fees usually carry a
forty-five percent withholding tax.5 These amounts are different,
however, in a number of Argentina's international tax
agreements. 7
In general, although Argentina tries to treat transactions be-
tween related parties in the same manner as transactions between
unrelated parties, 58 it will do so only if the price and conditions of
the transaction approximate those of an arm's length transaction."
Argentina is particularly concerned about transfer pricing abuse
with regard to loans and technology. Loans are reported to the
Central Bank, which may object to the terms of the loan within
thirty days if it believes the terms to be unreasonable.6 0 Under the
Transfer of Technology Law No. 21617 which governs intra-com-
pany transfers of licenses, patents, knowledge, engineering, instal-
lation, assistance, and other services, such transactions must be ap-
proved by the Authority of Application. Transactions are approved
when they approximate the expected market costs between unre-
lated parties. One exception to the transfer price approval process
occurs when trademarks are transferred. In those cases, no matter
how similar the transaction is to an arm's length exchange, no
transfer price will be accepted. 1 Yet, once the transaction is ap-
proved and registered,63 the purchaser is allowed to pay for the
52. Id.
53. TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL, TAX AND INVESTMENT PROFILE: ARGENTINA 29 (1984)
[hereinafter TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL: ARGENTINA].
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 30-31.
57. Id. at 31.
58. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN ARGENTINA PRICE WATERHOUSE INFORMA-
TION GUIDE 49 (1980) [hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE].
59. Id.
60. Id. at 54. See also COOPERS & LYBAN, 1987 INTERNATIONAL TAX SUMMARIES A-11
(1987) [hereinafter COOPERS & LYBRAND].
61. PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 58, at 10-11.
62. Transactions are registered in the National Register of Contracts of License and
[Vol. 20:2
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service and then deduct any corresponding expenses from tax due.
B. How Tax Rates Applicable to Foreign Entities in Argen-
tina Provide an Incentive for Transfer Pricing Abuse
Because Argentine corporations may be taxed at a rate up to
45% (if they distribute non-stock dividends overseas) 8 there is a
strong incentive to use transfer pricing to move profits from Argen-
tina to a home office or related entity located in a foreign jurisdic-
tion where the tax rates are lower. However, whether a corporation
is willing to use transfer pricing to evade Argentina's steep tax may
depend, in large part, on the severity of governmental restrictions
and efficacy of their enforcement by the government of Argentina.
C. Argentine Regulations Aimed at Controlling the Abuse of
Transfer Pricing
Argentina places a number of restrictions on the use of trans-
fer pricing which are specifically aimed at curbing its abuse. These
include a generally applicable rule, as well as regulations in certain
distinct areas, such as intra-company transfers of royalties, setting
of directors' salaries, transfers of technological and financial assis-
tance, and monitoring and setting of export and import prices.
Each of these rules and regulations is addressed below.
1. General rule of non-deductibility of overseas expenses
As previously stated,64 the general rule in Argentina is that
overseas expenses cannot be deducted from gross income, even if
the company's home office is overseas. The rationale for this rule is
the presumption that overseas expenses have been incurred in the
production of foreign income. In exceptional cases, however, this
presumption can be rebutted. The Tax Board may allow a deduc-
tion for overseas expenses if the company can prove that those ex-
penses directly affect the production of source income in
Argentina.
65
Transfer of Technology. Id.
63. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
65. Ganancias art. 116 (Arg. 1982)..
1989]
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2. Non-deductibility of royalties paid to a related party overseas
The first of Argentina's specific regulations concerns the de-
ductibility of royalty expenses paid by a local entity to a related
foreign company. In an important decision, the Supreme Court of
Argentina denied the right of a subsidiary or branch office to de-
duct royalty expenses from gross income. 6 In that case, the parent
corporation owned over ninety-nine percent of the local entity's
shares. The Court taxed the parent on the amount because it con-
sidered the expense Argentine source income subject to the corpo-
ration's income tax rate. This decision runs counter to and narrows
the general rule that domestic corporations may deduct license and
royalty expenses paid to overseas companies.6 7
3. Limits to the deductibility of salaries and remuneration of
overseas board members
Argentina generally allows board member fees to be deductible
from the fiscal balance sheet to which the payment is related68
However, if the directors reside overseas, the deductions available
for members who perform their duties abroad are limited e.6 Local
entities can deduct salaries and remuneration up to 12.5% of all
business profits earned by the entity, provided that those profits
are fully distributed as dividends. This is a fixed amount when the
service is provided "desde el exterior" (from outside of the coun-
try). Salaries and remuneration are limited to 2.5% of profits when
no dividends are paid. When some dividends are paid, there is a
sliding scale, ranging from 2.5% to 12.5%, which can be deducted
depending upon the amount of dividends distributed.70 Fees paid
to overseas board members are also included in the next section,
dealing with assistance expenses.
66. Judgment of Jul. 31, 1973, la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, Arg., 286
Fallos 97.
67. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos art. 73 (Arg. 1982); Ganancias arts. 116, 117 (Arg.
1982). Argentine Law No. 21617 provides that royalty payments for the use of trademarks
are not allowed. See also Chudnovsky, supra note 35, at 126.
68. Ganancias art. 136 (Arg. 1982).
69. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos art. 81(e) (Arg. 1982); Ganancias art. 138 (Arg. 1982).
70. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos art. 81(e) (Arg. 1982); Ganancias art. 138 (Arg. 1982)..
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4. General deductibility of expenses for technological and finan-
cial assistance by related companies
As a general rule, Argentina allows its business entities to de-
duct fees and remuneration paid for technological, financial, or
other assistance from overseas; however, the maximum deduction
is limited by two caps. 71 The first cap occurs when such fees and
remuneration represent three percent of sales or gross income of
the entity, whichever figure has formed the basis of the contract
for assistance. The second cap is fixed at five percent of the total
amount in fact invested in the assistance which was provided. Any
payments beyond these caps are not deductible. Moreover, they
are subject to the forty-five percent withholding tax for income re-
mitted abroad.
For transactions which were the product of technical or finan-
cial assistance by a parent, subsidiary, branch, or other related en-
tity (including third parties financially related to them), to an en-
terprise in Argentina, the government will regard these
transactions between related parties as taking place between unre-
lated entities, provided that the transactions comply with income
tax law restrictions. However, if there is noncompliance with the
law, the payments and transactions will be deemed to have pro-
duced profits of the foreign entity in Argentina."
71. Ganancias art. 138 (Arg. 1982).
72. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos art. 14 (Arg. 1982). Article 14, paragraphs 3 and 4,
reads as follows:
Los actos juridicos celebrados entre una empresa local de capital extranjero y Ia
persona fisica o juridica domiciliada en el exterior que directa o indirectamente
Ia controle serhn considerados, . . . entre partes independientes cuando sus
prestaciones y condiciones se ajusten a las pricticas normales del mercado entre
independientes, con las limitaciones siguientes:
1. Pr~stamos: Deberin ajustarse a las disposiciones establecidas en el inciso 1, del
articulo 20 de la Ley No. 21.382.
2. Contratos regidos por la Ley de Transferencia de Tecnologia: De acuerdo con
lo que al efecto establezca dicha ley.
Cuando no se cumplimenten los requisitos previstos en el pfrrafo anterior para
considerar a las respectivas operaciones como celebradas entre partes in-
dependientes, las prestaciones se tratarfin con arreglo a los principios que regu-
lan el aporte y la utilidad.
(Judicial acts and agreements between domestic corporations with foreign capital and a
physical or juridical person domiciled abroad who directly or indirectly controls it will be
considered arm's length transactions provided the terms and conditions reflect current mar-
ket norms among independent agencies with the following limitations: (1) Loans: Should
adjust to the conditions established in clause 1, article 20 of Law 21.382; (2) Contracts gov-
erned by the Technology Transfer Law: According to the procedures established by this law.
Provided the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph for the characterization of the
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5. Monitoring of export prices by the wholesale market price at
the place of destination
In general, Argentine exporters realize domestic source income
and are therefore subject to Argentine income tax.73 When the
price of exports falls below the wholesale price at the destination,
the Tax Board may consider whether the transaction was made be-
tween related parties. Indeed, given the presumption that the law
creates, and in the absence of contrary evidence, the tax authori-
ties may deem the exporter to have earned additional profits sub-
ject to a forty-five percent tax rate, thus treating the parties as if
related.7 ' The parties have the opportunity to justify the price. If
the Board maintains that the price is unjustified, it may tax the
Argentine exporter on the profits from the transaction using the
wholesale market price at either the foreign destination or the ex-
porter's own market.
78
6. Monitoring of import prices by the wholesale market price at
the place of destination
The controls on import price are quite similar to the controls
on export price. Generally, when foreign exporters realize a profit
from a sale to Argentina, they do not have Argentine source in-
come. Thus, they will not have any tax liability in Argentina.76 Yet,
if the Argentine importer is paying a price higher than the whole-
sale market price in the country of origin plus appropriate ship-
ping and insurance charges, the Tax Board may find that the
transaction has taken place between related parties. As with ex-
porting, the entities may submit evidence to justify the price set.
Assuming that the Tax Board still finds the price to be inappropri-
ate, the Board can charge an income tax based upon the created
margin or, in the alternative, upon local wholesale prices.
transaction as arm's length are not met loans between the parties will be treated according
to capital and equity principles.)
73. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos arts. 14, 5, 8(a) (Arg. 1982).
74. TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL: ARGENTINA, supra note 53, at 26.
75. Id. See also Ganancias arts. 8(a), 9, 10 (Arg. 1982).
76. Leyes y Decretos Impositivos arts. 5, 8 (Arg. 1982).
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III. How ECUADOR PRESENTLY COPES WITH TRANSFER PRICING
AND ITS ABUSES
A. A Brief Summary of Ecuador's Corporate Tax System as
It Affects Multinational Corporations
In Ecuador, corporations have differing tax rates depending on
their domicile or place of incorporation. Generally, there is a
twenty percent tax on undistributed profits." The basic income
tax rate on distributed profits for stockholders in Ecuador, includ-
ing the prior twenty percent rate on undistributed profits, is
twenty percent.7 S The rate of basic income tax on distributed prof-
its to foreign stockholders residing abroad is forty percent.79 In ad-
dition, the Ecuadorian code makes no provision for the filing of
consolidated tax returns.0
One investment guide for Ecuador summed up the tax law in-
volving intercompany charges as follows:
The law provides for the deductibility of necessary commissions
and expenses incurred abroad, as in the case of exportations.
Such expenses are determined on the basis of specific contracts
or as a maximum of 2 percent of export sales. Advertising con-
tracted abroad to promote sales of the local company is, in prac-
tice, accepted as deductible without giving rise to withholding of
income taxes.
Contracts involving technical, administrative and manage-
ment assistance from abroad and, in general, any type of service
that calls for the payment of fees, royalties, etc., on account of
intangible technical contributions require approval from the au-
thorities on a case by case basis. The authorities have the right
to regulate the period of the contract and the terms of payment.
. . . [With respect to royalties] no payment abroad is deductible
when the transaction or the contract is entered into between af-
filiated companies. Withholding of income taxes applies to all
the foregoing payments.8 "
77. TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL, TAX & INVESTMENT PROFILE: ECUADOR 14 (1984)
[hereinafter TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL: ECUADOR]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, CORPORATE TAXES:
A WORLDWIDE SUMMARY 112-16 (1988) [hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE/CORPORATE TAXES].
78. PRICE WATERHousE/CoRPoRATE TAXES, supra note 77, at 112-16.
79. Id.
80. DELOITE HASKINS & SELLS, TAXATION IN ECUADOR: A GUIDE FOR THE FOREIGN INVES-
TOR 34 (1986) [hereinafter DELorrrE].
81. PRICE WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN ECUADOR 82-83 (1981) [hereinafter PRICE
WATERHOUSE/ECUADOR]. See also DELorrrE, supra note 81, at 11. Intra-firm royalty pay-
ments are not deductible under Decision 24 of the Andean Pact. Chudnovsky, supra note
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Additionally, a special tax provision for foreign construction
companies permits a deduction of home office expenses of up to
twenty percent of the construction contract's value.82 However, the
home office must use a public accountant or governmental agency
to certify that the payment was credited to the home office ac-
counts.83 This documentation must be notarized by the Ecuadorian
consul abroad. 84
Ecuador charges a withholding tax on a number of types of
transfer payments. While no withholding tax is levied on interest,
loans are subject to a one-time special tax of one-half to two per-
cent of the loan principal at the time of registration with the Cen-
tral Bank.8 5 There is a forty percent withholding tax, plus addi-
tional surtaxes, on fees and royalties for technical assistance."
This forty percent plus surtax rate also applies to professional fees
remitted abroad.87 Finally, for dividends credited or remitted to
non-resident shareholders, there is a twenty percent withholding
tax with additional surtaxes.8
B. How Tax Rates Applicable to Foreign Corporations and
Shareholders in Ecuador Provide an Incentive for Transfer Pric-
ing Abuse
The fact that the tax rate for foreign entities in Ecuador is as
high as forty percent in the aggregate,89 creates an incentive for
abuse. If a company can use pricing to transfer profits from Ecua-
dor to either the home office or a third country with a lower tax
rate, that company will be able to avoid paying some of its tax
liability. The statutes of Ecuador reveal Ecuador's attempts to
curb this abuse.
35, at 126.
82. PRICE WATERHOUSE/E UADOR, supra note 81, at 83.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. DELOITTE, supra note 80, at 17.
86. Id. at 18.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20:2
TRANSFER PRICING
C. Specific Ecuadorian Laws Aimed at Controlling the
Abuse of Transfer Pricing
Articles 17, 19, and 20 of the Law in Ecuador substantively
impact on transfer pricing. Article 17 states that: "When the nor-
mal price depends on the quantity of a sale, such price will be de-
termined on the assumption that the sale is limited to the quantity
of commodities set forth in the declaration." 90 The text of Articles
19 and 20 is as follows:
Article 19. The price shown on the commercial invoice (except
when there is a doubt as to the correctness of the data contained
thereon) will be taken as a basis for determining the customs
value, provided that it complies with the conditions stipulated
for determining the normal price of the commodities.
Article 20. An importer should declare the value of the commod-
ities in conformity with the preceding Articles. Also, he should
provide the Customs and the Central Valuation Office with all
the data and commercial documents relating to the importation
that may be required for the purpose of verifying the taxable
value. The obligation prescribed in the preceding sentences will
be enforced on the importer for all commodities declared at the
Customs, including those which are exempted, in whole or in
part, from duties, and those which are subject to specific duties.
The Central Valuation Office is authorized to make such investi-
gations as it may deem necessary for verifying the taxable
value.91
The penultimate sentence in Article 20 is significant because it
provides that, whether or not an ad valorem tax is levied, the per-
tinent information is available to tax authorities for computation
of transfer prices. Yet, these provisions apply to the customs value
of goods and appear to be more concerned with low prices than
high prices. In fact, Article 21 authorizes the Minister of Finance
to establish minimum prices for commodities. Ecuadorian consuls
and commercial advisors abroad send wholesale price information
back to Ecuador to aid in the compilation of price lists.92 It might
90. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, EXPORTERS' ENCYCLOPAEDIA 1986/1987 2.448 (1986)
[hereinafter DUN'S MARKETING SERVICE].
91. Id.
92. Id. See also Trade Office Interview, supra note 34. One exporter stated that, in his
opinion, the Ecuadorian government was relying almost exclusively on the import duty to
prevent transfer pricing. Price lists are not used to establish maximum prices. However, this
may not prevent transfer pricing. Further, with other countries in the Andean Pact - coun-
tries for which a much lower tariff schedule applies - the goal of deterrence may not be
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be expected that, under this arrangement, and due to the ad
valorem tax, little over-invoicing of imported consumer goods
would occur. However, the provisions do not prevent over-invoicing
of capital goods and components usually exempt from customs du-
ties. Under the provisions of Article 24, the burden of persuasion is
placed upon the importers to ". . . substantiate the fact that the
declared prices are in agreement with the normal prices in the
country of origin.""3
Regarding intra-company transfers in particular, the Ecuado-
rian Law contains a provision which places the burden of persua-
sion on the interrelated companies to prove any contractual ar-
rangement they had between themselves."
Ecuador's Central Bank oversees export and import proce-
dures. It controls letter of credit issuances, collection authoriza-
tions and import licenses, as well as terms for import payment.9 " In
achieved. In fact, there are rumors that shrimp exporters have been using transfer pricing
quite effectively to their advantage in Ecuador. Telephone interview with Toni Diamond,
Finance Officer for Ecuador, Ford Finance, in Miami, Florida (Oct. 13, 1988).
93. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 90, at 2.448.
94. 1 FOREIGN TAX LAW ASSOCIATION, ECUADOR INCOME TAX SERVICE 31 (1986). This
section provides:
Article 46. Transactions Among Companies or Affiliated Individuals: The trans-
actions carried out among companies or associated persons among themselves, of
which a person or company is not subject to the income tax of Ecuador, they will
be required to present evidence, proof or special documentation which estab-
lishes the bargain and sale or transfer of machinery, products, lands, transfers of
rental, payments for services, whatever their nature may be, etc. For the pur-
poses considered here, the Director's Office of Income Tax can establish specific
individual regulations, to which the person or company who should pay the in-
come tax in Ecuador will be subject, so that the computation of the tax caused,
is the most beneficial to the country. Similarly, if a company or person is en-
gaged in operations, a part of which is subject to the income tax, and the other
not, the declaration rendered for the purposes of the income tax, can be submit-
ted to specific individual regulations or provisions which the Director's Office of
Income Tax will dictate.
According to one exporter, proving a price is particularly difficult when insurance,
transport and installation are included along with the sale of products. The Ecuadorian
government can demand a breakdown of all U.S. and Ecuadorian costs. Many expenses may
not qualify, and the exporter could stand to lose a great deal of money if the transaction is
not well documented. That same exporter stated that he personally lost US$30 to US$40
thousand dollars in sucres (the unit of currency in Ecuador, divided into 100 centavos) be-
cause of pre-shipment inspection delays of several weeks and disqualifications by the SGS.
Other exporters have also lost large sums of money. In conclusion, he stated that exporters
were not opposed to a reasonable and honest checking system, but that the system the SGS
employed created a mess that was simply "ridiculous." Telephone conversation with Mr.
Rafael Portela, Senior Vice President and Director, Contract Division, Calmaquip Engineer-
ing Corp., in Miami, Florida (Sept. 13, 1988).
95. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS: MARKETING IN ECUADOR 6
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the past, the Central Bank had a contract with the Societe Gener-
ale de Surveillance S.A. (SGS) to physically inspect the quality,
quantity, and price of exports." After the SGS had inspected the
export or import, it issued a "Report of Findings" containing its
opinion of the transaction. 7 A "Clean Report of Findings" would
satisfy the Central Bank as to the quality, quantity, and price of
the export.
IV. How ECUADOR MIGHT BETTER DETER TRANSFER PRICING
ABUSE
Ecuador has a simpler, more discretionary system for control-
ling abuse than does Argentina. Because the Febres Cordero Ad-
ministration in Ecuador attempted to alleviate the country's inter-
nal economic crisis" by liberalizing domestic regulation of foreign
investment,99 the incoming government may wish to preserve
whatever progress was made and should, perhaps, reconsider the
further regulation of transfer pricing. In so doing, the government
should analyze the potential impact on the present economy of a
change in transfer pricing regulation. Because Argentina has a
more highly developed tax code, Ecuador should begin by examin-
ing how Argentina tackles the same problem. Of course, Ecuador
will want to consider other options available to deter transfer pric-
ing abuse.
(1985) [hereinafter OVERSEAS BusINEss REPORT]. See also Trade Office Interview, supra note
34.
96. OVERSEAS BusINEss REPORT, supra note 95. According to one official at the U.S.
Embassy at Quito, the Central Bank decided to discontinue its contractual relationship with
the SGS at the beginning of 1988. Because no alternative entity replaced the SGS, the Cen-
tral Bank presently performs the functions previously delegated to the SGS under the con-
tract. It is expected that the Equadorian government will either contract with another pre-
shipment inspection firm, or re-hire the SGS in the near future. Whether the Central Bank
or some other entity performs the transaction approval functions, opportunities for abuse
continue to exist. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, during the final year of its
administration, the Cordero government made no attempt to contront the problem of trans-
fer pricing. Moreover, the Borja government has not yet considered or proposed any changes
to the tax code aimed at preventing such abuse. Telephone Interview with Gordon Jones,
Commercial Attache, U.S. Embassy, Quito, Ecuador (Oct. 13, 1988). The Ecuadorian Trade
Office affirmed that the Central Bank will continue to perform the duties once performed by
the SGS. Trade Office Interview, supra note 34.
97. OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 95.
98. U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNrrED STATES: EcuADoR 4-11 (1986) [hereinafter FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS].
99. INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 42, at 1-2.
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A. Steps Ecuador Has Already Taken To Deter Transfer
Pricing Abuse
As noted earlier, there are many reasons for engaging in trans-
fer pricing abuse which are not motivated by a desire to evade
taxes. 100 Ecuador has already eliminated some of the non-tax in-
centives for abuse. For example, Ecuador no longer requires that
firms be nationally owned. 01 Thus, parent firms with holdings in
Ecuador are no longer forced to use transfer pricing as a means to
repatriate profits to the parent without splitting the revenue with
local owners and without paying any tax on dividends. 02 Ecuador
has also eliminated restrictions on repatriation of profits, 08 so that
the incentive to use transfer pricing as a surrogate for repatriation
is no longer present. However, shortly after the government trans-
ferred private foreign exchange transactions from the Central
Bank to the free market - making transfer pricing less attractive
- it withdrew this concession and increased the term for domestic
currency deposits, forcing importers to deposit sucres equivalent to
100% of the value of imports for List 1B items (mostly capital
goods and raw materials), and 160% for List 2 items (mostly lux-
ury goods).' 0 4 By engaging in this policy reversal, the government
created an incentive to use transfer pricing as a means to avoid
perceived difficulties in transacting business with the Central
Bank. At this point, Ecuador may need to take additional steps
toward decreasing the incentives for abuse.
100. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
101. INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 42, at 1.
102. For a discussion of the problems with which Greece was faced regarding this situa-
tion, see Roumeliotis, supra note 26.
103. INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 42, at 1. See also THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT, COUNTRY PROFILE: ECUADOR 40 (1988) [hereinafter COUNTRY PROFILE]. As an encour-
agement to foreign investors, the new government in Ecuador has also taken economic mea-
sures to put its house in order. Ecuador Announces Steps to Stem Economic Crisis, J. Com-
merce (Sept. 1, 1988).
104. INVESTMENT CLIMATE, supra note 42, at 9. For details regarding the exchange rate,
see COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 103, at 40. For details on the requirements for approval of
the transaction by the Central Bank, see id. at 12. The general perception that Ecuador is in
the midst of an economic and political crisis adds to the incentive for transfer pricing abuse.
For a summary of the political and economic problems facing the nation, see Martz, Insta-
bility in Ecuador, 87 CURRENT HIST. 17 (1988). Moreover, Ecuador's inability to repay its
debt may further deter investment in the country. Ecuador May Withold Some Debt Pay-
ments, J. Commerce (Sept. 2, 1988). See also Official Says Country Must Renegotiate Debt,
Quito Voz de los Andes, Oct. 29, 1988, as reprinted in 88-213 Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service - Latin America (FBIS-LAT), Nov. 3, 1988, at 38.
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B. An Examination of the Alternatives Available to
Ecuador
Transfer pricing abuse is most likely to occur with finished or
consumer goods, which are subject to import and value added
taxes, because over-invoicing to transfer profit abroad will only re-
sult in increased import and value added taxes. By contrast, how-
ever, intermediate goods, capital goods, and raw materials carry
relatively little import duty, and thus are more likely to be the
subject of abuse. Similarly, where services are treated unfavorably,
either by denial of deductibility or by imposition of a gross with-
holding tax, the benefits to be derived from transfer pricing abuse
will be small enough to deter significantly any such actions. How-
ever, where services are subject to a low rate of withholding tax
and deductibility, the advantages of, and opportunities for abuse
will be significantly enhanced. Thus, with regard to those transfers
in which the payment is deductible in Ecuador and little tax is
levied on the transfer payment, abuse will be most likely to occur.
There are a number of methods Ecuador can use to deter
transfer pricing abuse. In attempting to employ a method which
utilizes the correct arm's length price, Ecuador should always be-
gin by inquiring whether the expense is legitimate in the first
place. Assuming that it is, Ecuador can go on to estimate a defensi-
ble transfer price. The method of establishing an actual transfer
price through formal accounting procedures is currently used by
Ecuador, and by Argentina for transactions involving goods. Other
methods include: taxing intra-firm transfers; limiting the deduct-
ibility of certain expenses for services, as Argentina does; imposing
artificial restraints; and using notional pricing for exports. There
are two options which do not try to establish a true transfer price.
The first involves a tax on world income, with tax credits given for
foreign tax paid. This is a variation on the idea that there should
be a single, world tax rate. The second of these options is the utili-
zation of an apportionment scheme. While none of these ap-
proaches is perfect, some are better suited to Ecuador's situation
than are others. Each alternative will be discussed and evaluated
below, with an eye toward finding the least objectionable method
by which Ecuador may deter transfer pricing abuse.
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1. Attempt to establish the actual transfer price through formal
accounting
At present, Ecuador attempts to determine the actual transfer
price on a case-by-case basis. °1 0 The Ecuadorian code may thus ap-
pear quite unfavorable to multinational corporations, which have
the burden of establishing that their prices are in conformity with
normal prices. 06 Until recently, the SGS had a great deal of discre-
tion in the implementation of this policy, 107 and very little guid-
ance was available to investors who wanted to know exactly how
the SGS reached its decisions and recommendations. 108 At the be-
ginning of 1988, the formal accounting process once again became
the responsibility of the Central Bank, although it remains quite
possible that the government will enter into another contract with
the SGS (or another firm) to handle the procedure.
The multinational corporations which Ecuador seeks to attract
require more specific guidelines as to how the formal accounting
process works, so that they have some indication of whether their
transfer prices will meet with approval. Ecuador could create a
more certain investment climate by limiting and defining the role
of the Central Bank (or whomever is in charge of the pre-shipment
inspection)."0 9 The Office of the United States Trade Representa-
105. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
106. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 90, at 2.448.
107. See supra note 96. For a general discussion regarding the broad powers delegated
to pre-shipment inspection firms throughout the Third World, and the problems which re-
sult from their discretionary exercise of such powers, see Barone, Make Inspection a Trade
Issue, J. Commerce (Apr. 5, 1988).
108. See supra note 97. According to one exporter, not only were exporters to Ecuador
unable to understand how the SGS established prices, the SGS itself, when askedd to eluci-
date its methods and bases for determining acceptable transfer prices, could offer no expla-
nation. The exporter tried to obtain information from the SGS, the Central Bank, and other
sources within the government of Ecuador, and finally concluded that no one "had any idea
what SGS was doing." The pricing system, he stated, was extremely unfavorable to export-
ers, who had no predictable standard by which to measure the likelihood of transfer price
approval. Thus, even those exporters who set their transfer prices in good faith, according to
reasonable commercial standards, may have their transactions nullified or delayed for un-
known and therefore unappealable reasons, either legitimate or illegitimate. Exporters, in
turn, will be encouraged to "jack up their prices to cover for the delays and the uncertainty.
• . . This is ultimately paid for by the Ecuadorian people." Telephone interview with Ar-
mando Paz, Treasurer, Calmaquip Engineering Corp., in Miami, Florida (Sept. 13, 1988).
For a more generalized discussion of problems that occur with pre-shipment inspections,
and in particular, problems associated with the SGS in Ecuador and elsewhere, see Pre-
Shipment Checks: A Stranglehold or a Submission, 60 TRADE FIN. 43 (1988).
109. Neither the Ecuadorian Embassy in Washington, nor the SGS offices in Miami
and New York would provide the author with a copy of their agreement regulating the con-
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tive has received numerous complaints about the SGS from U.S.
exporters. 110 Representatives of exporters in Florida filed, but later
withdrew, a Section 301 petition concerning the SGS and other
pre-shipment inspection companies operating in Latin America. ' "
It is apparent that dissatisfaction with the SGS and similar compa-
nies which operate as agents of foreign governments, impedes the
flow of international trade. ' Multinational enterprises are de-
terred from entering into business operations in Ecuador because
of the present policy. Ecuador might change this situation by
adopting the approach of Argentina, and spelling out in a more
predictable and calculable manner how transfer prices are estab-
lished for transactions involving goods. Like Argentina, Ecuador
already has provisions establishing a credible price monitoring
mechanism.113 However, Argentina, unlike Ecuador, places the ex-
plicit use of these mechanisms in the Tax Law."' While Ecuador
uses price listings overseas as a means to check abuse in a highly
discretionary process, 115 Argentina uses similar information to cre-
ate a range of objectively verifiable transfer prices."' This differ-
ence is significant, in that a foreign entity may perceive that Ecua-
dor uses the price lists to make discretionary judgments, whereas
Argentina presumes transfer prices to be reasonable and defensible
and only uses the lists to check serious abuse in cases where prices
are truly out of line. Although in reality both countries may make
identical use of the lists, Argentina's approach seems more condu-
cive and conciliatory to foreign investment. In short, Ecuador may
wish to consider modifying public use of lists designed to check
duct of the SGS. The U.S. Departments of State and of Commerce similarly did not have a
copy of the agreement for distribution. The State Department informed the author that the
details of the agreement were confidential and not available to the public. This situation is a
disincentive for investment in Ecuador because potential investors cannot obtain informa-
tion on import guidelines.
According to British trade law professor, Clive Schmitthoff, "Exporters have com-
plained that the inspection organization insisted on an unjustified reduction of a price
firmly agreed with the overseas buyer, or that it demanded the disclosure of a price calcula-
tion regarded as confidential." Pre-Shipment Checks: A Stranglehold or a Submission,
supra note 108. For further criticism of pre-shipment inspections, see Barone, supra note
107.
110. Telephone interview with Betsy Stillman, Director for Andean and Caribbean Af-
fiars, United States Trade Representative (Apr. 9, 1987).
111. Id. See also 51 Fed Reg. 32,387 (1986).
112. Id. See also 51 Fed. Reg. 32,387 (1986).
113. See supra note 92.
114. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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transfer pricing abuse in order to alter the present perception that
judgments are discretionary.
In addition to having an explicit price monitoring system, Ec-
uador could take two additional steps to ensure that actual trans-
fer prices are in conformity with reported prices. First, Ecuador
could audit the firm to verify reported prices. Tax authorities
could gather information on prices from a variety of sources: other
branches of government; Andean Pact and OPEC nations; other
international agencies; the firm itself; and other nations. Because
other nations may be reluctant to freely divulge such information
without a bilateral treaty, Ecuador may wish to enter into agree-
ments with its major trade partners to exchange information.' 17 On
the other hand, when entering into tax treaties with tax haven na-
tions, Ecuador should insist on exchange of information agree-
ments with these jurisdictions."" As an enticement to be party to
such an agreement, Ecuador, along with other Andean Pact na-
tions, could threaten to increase taxation on transactions with tax
havens, as well as increase penalties for proven abuse in these ar-
eas. Further, Ecuador might impose a higher burden of proof on
corporations dealing in tax havens to justify their transfer prices.
Second, correlative price adjustments should also be consid-
ered," '9 and could best be implemented where a tax treaty is in
place. This would minimize the risk of double taxation while
preventing transfer pricing abuse. Unfortunately, Ecuador has no
single policy regarding the avoidance of double taxation.2 0 The
only nations with which it has ratified and signed a tax treaty are
those of the Andean Pact.'2 ' Thus, when Ecuador audits a firm,
Ecuador may wish to use a correlative adjustment procedure. This
would allow any upward adjustment in Ecuador to be matched
117. Casey, supra note 2, at 240-41 (recommending the negotiation of international
agreements for cooperation to assist governments in prohibiting transfer price
manipulation).
Ecuador's major markets in 1984 were: United States, 64 percent; Latin American Inte-
gration Association (ALADI), three percent; and the European Community, three percent.
Ecuador's major suppliers in 1984 were: United States, 32 percent; the European Commu-
nity, 16 percent; Japan, 13 percent, and ALADI, 19 percent. U.S. Dept. State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Background Notes: Ecuador 1 (1986).
118. Fiddlers, supra note 6, at 109.
119. This is also referred to as "corresponding adjustments." OECD/1984, supra note
45, at 9.
120. PRICE WATERHOUSE/ECUADOR, supra note 81, at 94.
121. The Andean Pact consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. See id. Ec-
uador has no other signed tax treaties. See DELoi'Tr, supra note 80, at 11.
[Vol. 20:2
TRANSFER PRICING
with a downward adjustment in the host country. The opposite
would also hold true. There are two benefits to this procedure.
First, it avoids the threat of double taxation. 2 ' Second, by not
punishing the firm for arriving at a different conclusion than did
the government, it acknowledges the difficulties in setting transfer
prices. Thus, the mechanism ensures that the government can es-
tablish an arm's length price without discouraging foreign invest-
ment. 23 Although correlative adjustment mechanisms are highly
regarded by some, one limitation on use of the mechanism is that
... the competent authorities have only a duty to negotiate;
they are not required to reach an agreement, nor are they re-
quired to implement it when reached and; indeed, they may be
unable to do so because of conflicting domestic law - such as
that imposing time limits on the adjustment of assessments or
on the making of refunds of tax. In the view of [multinational
enterprises] this is a serious weakness in the arrangements.""
Furthermore, these arrangements empirically have been slow and
unpredictable. 5 In addition, despite the 1979 OECD Model Con-
vention's provisions,'26 Ecuador's correlative price mechanism
should require and make explicit that Ecuador decides each case
on its own merits. This would counteract the corporations' fear
that when tax authorities attempt to agree, they may compromise
one company's claim for that of another.'27 The mechanism should
also allow for the corporations to be kept abreast of progress and
discussions concerning the corporation's case. 28
Finally, treaties could allow for the creation of binding arbi-
tration between member nations when they disagree on the appro-
122. Fiddlers, supra note 6, at 109 (claiming that large scale, simultaneous audits by
several jurisdictions will become more popular with international tax authorities in the com-
ing years.
123. For a more detailed discussion of correlative adjustment mechanisms, see Irish,
supra note 4, at 60. For a model provision showing how this mechanism would work, see
MODEL CONVENTION art. 9, cl. 2 (OECD 1979) [hereinafter OECD/1979]. For a similar provi-
sion by the United Nations Group of Tax Experts, see Surrey, United Nations Group of
Experts and the Guidelines for Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Coun-
tries, 19 HARY. INT'L L.J. 1, 54 (1978). See generally UNrrED NATIONS DEPT. INT'L ECON. &
SocIAL AFFAIRS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - SIXTH
REPORT, 1976, U.N. Sales No. E.76.XVI.3 (1980).
124. OECD/1984, supra note 45, at 17.
125. Id. at 8.
126. OECD/1979, supra note 123.
127. OECD/1984, supra note 45, at 18.
128. For a discussion of concerns about how this might function, see id. at 33.
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priate transfer price.1 29 This would aid to shore up the corporate
perception of correlative price mechanisms by ensuring against the
threat of double taxation. Further, exchange of information
through treaty arrangements would enable Ecuador to have a bet-
ter understanding of the operations of multinational corporations,
improve their own audit abilities and monitor the pricing of firms
with less administrative cost.' 0
Argentina's and Ecuador's present case-by-case method is only
one of the options available in the regulation of transfer pricing in
the area of intangible property. The United Nations has outlined
the two main approaches most commonly taken.' The first ap-
proach involves either a lump sum payment for the patent or in-
tangible property, or a royalty fixed in relation to a specific base
such as gross sales, or production. 3 2 The second approach involves
the sharing of research and development costs among related com-
panies.133 Ecuador could utilize both approaches, together with tax
treaties and correlative adjustment procedures,"" to develop a
mechanism that would allow for legitimate expenses while guard-
ing against abuse.
Determination of an arm's length price using monitoring, au-
dits, and correlative adjustments works best when comparable
goods are available on the open market. When no comparable good
is available on the open market, and in the case of pricing services
and intangibles, an appropriate price may be difficult or impossible
to ascertain because there are no readily identifiable and compara-
ble open market transactions, "comparable uncontrolled price
methods"'3 5 of calculating the actual transfer price will not work.
129. The European Economic Community has a Draft Directive of the European Com-
munities by the Assembly of the Communities and by the Economic and Social Committee
under the Treaty of Rome, which essentially outlines how this could work. It is discussed in
OECD/1984, supra note 45, at 21-25. A treaty solely between two nations should be more
workable than the EEC one, which is quite complex.
130. Monitoring multinational corporations has been troublesome, even for the United
States Internal Revenue Service. A treaty would do much to help Ecuador. See generally
GLOBAL REACH, supra note 13, at 206, 282-83.
131. UNITED NATIONS, TAX TREATIES BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
- SEVENTH REPORT, 1978, at 35-36, U.N. Sales No. E.78.XVI.1 (1978) [hereinafter SEVENTH
REPORT].
132. This appears to be the approach taken by Argentina.
133. For a more detailed discussion of these options, see generally Irish, supra note 4,
at 22-25.
134. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
135. This is defined and discussed in OECD, TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 34-38 (1979) [hereinafter OECD/TRANSFER PRICING].
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The "resale price method"1 6 is similarly plagued in those in-
stances where there is a great deal of disagreement over what a
"fair" mark-up for profit should be, or indeed whether there
should be a profit at all. The "cost plus method" runs into trouble
when the definition of "costs" is debated. For example, do costs
include research, advertising, or management? Finally, the "negoti-
ated price method" may be the worst method of all.' 37 In the give
and take of negotiation, the final price is often based on criteria
which are not objectively verifiable. Moreover, this is the crux of
the present criticism of the Ecuadorian system. 38 Thus, the deter-
mination of actual transfer prices should be explicitly limited to
the area where it works best - transactions involving goods for
which there is an ascertainable open market price.
In addition to considering Argentina's price guideline method
of checking transfer pricing abuse with respect to goods, 39 Ecua-
dor may wish to consider some of the following options.
2. Taxation of intra-firm transfers
With regard to goods being sold to Ecuadorian companies,
there is less chance of over-invoicing due to ad valorem duties or
the value added tax placed on most imported goods.' ° However,
for those goods not covered by the import ad valorem tax,'" as
well as for services and intangibles, a tax on intra-firm transfers
might be desirable to curb abusive transfer pricing. This would en-
tail placing a withholding tax or a net income tax on the profit
portion of the intra-firm transactions. Unfortunately, this method
has a number of drawbacks.
First, there is the problem of determining which sales should
be taxed. If Ecuador only taxes sales within the jurisdiction, a
company can move the place of sale across the frontier. If extra-
territorial sales are taxed, problems result with respect to taxing an
136. Id. at 38-40.
137. See, e.g., Fiddlers, supra note 6.
138. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
139. Argentina's guidelines are similar to those suggested by the OECD Model Conven-
tion. See OECD/1979, supra note 123. See also TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL, TAX AND IN-
VESTMENT PROFILE: ARGENTINA, supra note 53, at 32.
140. The value added tax is summarized in TOUCHE Ross INTERNATIONAL: ECUADOR,
supra note 77, at 18; DELOITTE, supra note 80, at 43.
141. Exempt items include medicine, magazines, books, newspapers, basic food prod-
ucts, exports, and other products. DELorrrz, supra note 80, at 43.
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entity which is not a permanent establishment.
Second, services can easily be rendered outside of the taxing
jurisdiction. Thus, unless Ecuador decides to tax services provided
outside of Ecuador and ignore the lack of permanent establish-
ment, Ecuador will not have a basis for taxing the provider of the
service.
Ecuador might consider denying to Ecuadorian entities the de-
ductibility of transactions beyond Ecuador's tax jurisdiction. Yet
this might result in the denial of deductions for legitimate ex-
penses, thereby motivating firms to engage in transfer pricing in
other areas to make up for the loss in deductibility. Further, it
would negate the positive steps Ecuador has already taken to curb
abuse.1"2 Thus, this is not a very satisfactory method of preventing
abusive transfer pricing in Ecuador.
Argentina's scheme forbids a subsidiary or branch of a foreign
corporation to deduct royalty expenses from gross income. 43 While
this rule does give domestic firms a competitive advantage over the
operations of foreign entities in Argentina, it may also serve to dis-
courage foreign investment in that jurisdiction, since the rule elim-
inates the deductibility of legitimate expenses of a corporation. Ar-
gentina, because it is newly industrialized, and because
multinational corporations prefer more developed markets, may be
able to do this without causing investment disincentive. 44 Ecua-
dor, however, cannot afford to discourage investment by adopting
the Argentine rule. At present, Ecuadorian law calls for approval of
royalty expense deductions and deductions for other intellectual
property on a case-by-case basis,'4 5 with no deduction being given
for related party transactions.'" Ecuador's provisions regarding
royalties could be modified to allow for defensible transfer prices
without as much discretionary judgment as is now the case. This
would better reflect the reality of international transactions and
would decrease the motivation to engage in transfer pricing abuse
142. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Interestingly, this rule is contrary
to the general rule of deductibility of license and royalty expenses paid to overseas compa-
nies by domestic firms. Id.
144. See THIRD SURVEY, supra note 18.
145. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
146. Id. As noted earlier, even Argentina allows a deduction for related party transac-
tions involving licenses, patents, knowledge, engineering, installation, assistance, and other
services, provided that they are approved by the Authority of Application. See supra notes
58-61 and accompanying text.
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in other activities. Further, a liberalization in this area would offset
tightening restrictions in other areas. So long as the Ecuadorian
government realizes the difficulties of setting a transfer price and
allows the corporations a "good faith" range in which to set prices,
liberalization of provisions regarding royalties and other transfers
could enhance Ecuador's investment image.
3. Limiting the deductibility of expenses
Another method to deter abuse which Ecuador may wish to
consider is using limitations on the deductibility of certain ex-
penses. Argentina allows deductions for fees, salaries, and other re-
muneration to foreign members of a company's corporate board of
directors. 47 However, the deductions are capped by objective, easy
to compute formulas. Ecuador considers this a "payment for ser-
vices" under Article 46, which again places the burden on the firm
to establish the merit of the transaction. " 8 Not only does Ecua-
dor's provision increase uncertainty, but it also has the potential
for creating a perception of uneven enforcement. The merit of Ar-
gentina's provision is that it is easy to enforce, as well as easy to
comply with. As Ecuador already allows a deduction, a less discre-
tionary standard may prove more manageable for both government
and business.
Argentina allows the deduction of expenses for technology, fi-
nancial assistance and other help from abroad even if the entities
are related. ""' Yet, as with remuneration to board members, Argen-
tina places an easily calculated, objective cap on the deductibility
of these expenses. 150 In contrast, Ecuador places the burden on the
parties to prove the legitimacy of the expenses before allowing a
deduction.'' Again, a liberalization of Ecuador's approach in this
area might prove beneficial.
Argentina's approach with respect to remuneration to board
members has the advantage of allowing for legitimate expenses
while insuring that the deductions do not deviate too radically
from the expected norm. Ecuador's case-by-case approach is a dis-
incentive to foreign capital investment. Companies now required to
147. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, supra note 90, at 2.448.
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report to the Director's Office of Income Tax for specific individual
regulations computed in a manner "most beneficial to the coun-
try, ' 15 2 could, under this scheme, deduct defensible assistance ex-
penses up to a reasonable limit.
On closer inspection, it becomes apparent this proposal is
flawed as well. The determination of the expense is no more cer-
tain here than was the establishment of an actual transfer price
under previous methods. This proposal has the additional limita-
tion of not allowing for legitimate expenses above a certain artifi-
cially-imposed cap. Thus, this method also is vulnerable to
criticism.
4. Artificial restraints
Artificial restraints are yet another way to prevent abuse.
Under this method, Ecuador would ban certain types of suspect
payments to related entities outside of Ecuador. At present, Argen-
tina bars any transfer price payment for trademarks.1 53 This is
probably the most drastic and least desirable method in today's
business world, where firms are often dependent on related entities
for information and expertise, trademarks, patents, engineering,
machines, liquidity, and so on. Again, given the strides Ecuador
has taken to deter abusive transfer pricing by improving the eco-
nomic climate,'" this approach may be least desirable for Ecuador.
5. Notional prices
Posted or notional prices are often used for primary commodi-
ties. This method establishes the price of a primary good as a per-
centage of a downstream product for which a price is available.
Such a system is also available for intermediate goods.1 55 Thus,
this mechanism can be used to establish an objectively verifiable
transfer price.158
Notional prices can be used to check transfer pricing abuse
with regard to primary products. Basically, notional prices amount
152. Id.
153. See PRICE WATERHOUSE, supra note 58.
154. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
155. Supra note 33, at 20.




to an official export price listed by the government. They have the
advantages of being both extremely easy to calculate and predict-
able. On the down side, notional prices can only be established
where open market prices allow for such a price. Thus, the method
is not really very practical where intangibles, services, and non-
open market goods are involved. Given these shortcomings, the use
of notional prices should be limited to the export of primary
products.
The last two options available to Ecuador do not attempt to
use methods to estimate the true transfer price. Instead, they
break from these earlier methods by trying to use generalizations
rather than accounting formalities to estimate a proper income
allocation.
6. Taxation of world income with tax credits
If there were a globally uniform tax rate, the tax evasion in-
centive for transfer pricing would disappear.157 Whether profits
surfaced in one country or another, the same tax would be due.
Unfortunately, such a system does not now exist. Further, there
may be policy reasons why such a system would be undesirable.
Developing countries may wish to give tax incentives to encourage
investment. Tax havens, which owe their wealth to their tax status,
will obviously be reluctant to join in with such a plan. Thus, this
concept is not feasible in today's economic world.
Yet Ecuador could consider a similar plan in an adapted form.
This would entail computing the tax base as a company's world-
wide income and then giving tax credits for taxes already paid
overseas. Under this system, to the extent that a company is able
to move profits from a high tax jurisdiction to another lower tax
jurisdiction, the reward for such a transfer will be non-existent, be-
cause less tax credits will be accumulated in the low tax jurisdic-
tion. In theory, this would put an end to the tax evasion incentive
for transfer pricing abuse.
However, this system creates many additional problems. First,
the scheme does nothing to discourage non-tax reasons for transfer
157. For a discussion of "international harmonization of taxes," see S. PLASSCHAERT,
supra note 15, at 14, 104-05. Interestingly, Pope Paul VI's statements during Vatican II
support the notion of a worldwide tax system. See R. BROWN, THEOLOGY IN A NEW KEY 33
(1978). Similarly, the World Council of Churches, a main line Protestant organization, has
called for a system of international taxation for world development. Id. at 41.
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pricing abuse.'"8 Second, other developing nations would object to
this formulation because it would financially deprive companies of
the benefits they receive from operating in countries which grant
tax holidays as a means to stimulate investment. Third, Ecuador
would in effect be able to tax non-Ecuadorian foreign source in-
come any time a company conducted business in any other country
which had a lower tax rate than that of Ecuador. This would mean
that corporations would be deterred from conducting business in
Ecuador. Thus, this approach is not one which Ecuador should se-
riously consider.
7. Apportionment schemes
A final method by which Ecuador could effectively tax corpo-
rations on their Ecuadorian income and deter transfer pricing
abuse is the use of an apportionment mechanism. This method
taxes the entire unitary corporation on a portion of its worldwide
income. 59 The portion taxed is determined by an apportionment
formula, which allocates world income on the basis of such factors
as sales,160 property, and payroll. Many American states have ap-
portionment formulas, although the formulas vary from state to
state."6 However, many states subscribe to the Council of State
Government's "Multistate Tax Compact," 1 2 which the U.S. Su-
preme Court has held to be valid, despite the fact that it lacks
Congressional endorsement."8 3 The compact outlines a uniform
formula for allocating income for net income tax purposes among
the states.1
64
The apportionment method has a number of virtues. First, it
is easy to administer. Ecuador would not need to conduct elaborate
audits to discover the "true" transfer price because transfer prices
158. Irish, supra note 4, at 75.
159. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
160. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (upholding Iowa's single factor
formula as applied, based on percentage of sales in the state).
161. For example, Wisconsin has a statute on allocation, apportionment, and situs of
income. Wis. STAT. § 71.07 (1985).
162. The compact is laid out in Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Taxation -
Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1976).
163. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). See also
Brooks, Worldwide Combination Upheld at Cost to the Commerce Clause, 2 J. STATE TAX
293-314 (1984); Christian, Howe & Harrington, State Power to Tax Interstate Carriers: The
Supreme Court's Decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion, 55 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 219-41 (1988).
164. For a discussion of the compact, see Corrigan, supra note 162, at 423.
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are irrelevant under this scheme. Multinationals can set the trans-
fer price at whatever they like without influencing the overall
profit of the unitary corporation. Second, it is predictable. Unlike
the "fuzzy" nature of transfer pricing, apportionment formulas are
clear and objective. This also aids in the avoidance of the favorit-
ism presently engaged in by the tax administration under Ecua-
dor's current system of discretion. Third, many multinationals op-
erating in the United States are already familiar with the system
and are accustomed to using it. 65 Even though the method is not
popular outside of the United States, the fact that it has wide cur-
rency within the country suggests that it could be employed
elsewhere.
Still, there are criticisms of apportionment systems. First, it
may result in over- and under-taxation. For example, if parent of
Unitary Corporation is located in country A, and related corpora-
tion, Subsidiary, is located in country B, if the overall profits of
Unitary Corporation are $100.00, an apportionment formula might
allocate this profit $50.00 to parent and $50.00 to Subsidiary, as-
suming that labor, sales, and property were equally distributed be-
tween the two jurisdictions. However, in actuality, Subsidiary may
have had a profit of $120.00, and parent a loss of $20.00, or vice-
versa. Thus, the apportionment formula would over- or under-tax
the entity. 6 ' But this criticism ignores the fact that apportionment
allows the flexibility of averaging of taxes and income. Over- and
under-taxation is the strength of apportionment because it allows
corporations to use profits which would be taxed in one jurisdiction
for investment in new areas which may create losses in the early
years due to start-up expenses.
Second, critics of apportionment claim that the record-keeping
involved in the system is too burdensome. Yet, since corporations
operating in the United States are required to keep such records,
many multinationals already have the records available. Ecuador
could further ease the record-keeping burden by allowing records
to be denominated in U.S. dollars instead of requiring that they be
translated into sucres.
Third, it is argued that the system is unpopular with multina-
tionals. Some American states have repealed their laws mandating
165. For an opposing viewpoint, see OECDTRANSFER PRICING, supra note 135, at 14
(calling "global" methods "radical," and noting their non-conformity with Articles 7 and 9
of the OECD Model Double Taxation Convention).
166. Id. at 14 (global methods of income allocation called "arbitrary").
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a unitary formula after foreign businesses threatened to pull out of
the state.16 In this respect, the apportionment method is admit-
tedly quite controversial. However, it is important to note that the
threats came to the states from foreign multinational corporations.
Further, such objections may be a response to the certainty of tax-
ation involved with this system. Apportionment allows for no
transfer price evasion of tax. Thus, the objections by multination-
als may be seen in another light as an acknowledgement of the
perceived effectiveness of the plan at preventing tax evasion.
Fourth, apportionment has been criticized in the United
States because it involves the states in the diplomatic arena. In-
deed, while the Supreme Court has never flunked an apportion-
ment scheme on its face, "Congress could prevent the use of the
unitary business concept, and . . . a treaty might also forbid em-
ploying the concept." 16 8 Indeed, Congress has in one case man-
dated that states may not tax foreign corporations if all they do in
the state is solicit orders.169 Thus, states may be reluctant to adopt
such a scheme because of a fear of later federal intervention. How-
ever, Ecuador need not have these concerns, being a sovereign na-
tion. Thus, the appeal of apportionment becomes stronger.
Fifth, apportionment presents the problem of precisely defin-
ing a "unitary corporation." Depending upon the circumstances,
tax authorities may want a broad interpretation, while corpora-
tions may desire a narrow view, or vice-versa. The inclusion of
more overseas entities in a unitary corporation will yield two re-
sults. First, it will increase the income subject to apportionment.
Second, it will decrease the percentage of that income which will
be attributable to the jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has
held that the taxpayer always has the "distinct burden of showing
by 'clear and cogent evidence' that [the state tax] results in extra-
territorial values being taxed.' 7 0 Thus, the U.S. standard is a
starting point. Ecuadorian tax officials could make their best calcu-
lation as to what constitutes a unitary corporation under Ecuado-
rian tax law and then place the burden on the taxpayer to rebut
the presumption.
Sixth, apportionment raises the possibility of double taxa-
167. Baldwin & O'Conner, Notes for Constitutional Law I 25 (Fall 1986) (unpublished
notes for a course taught at the University of Wisconsin Madison Law School).
168. Id. at 24.
169. Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 175 (1983).
170. Container Corp. of America, 463 U.S. at 175.
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tion. 71 Indeed, some of the income taxed by foreign nations with-
out apportionment because attributed to a taxpayer's foreign sub-
sidiaries, may also be taxed in Ecuador as the Ecuadorian portion
of the total income of the unitary corporation of which Ecuadorian
operations were a part.7 2 Yet double taxation is not an inevitable
result of apportionment. Apportionment merely uses mathematical
generalizations to estimate the allocation of income, while the
arm's length approaches utilize complex and formal accounting
mechanisms. From one point of view, allocation on the basis of the
factors of production and the amount of sales is a more accurate
measure than allocation on the basis of arm's length accounting
formalities. 73 Thus, if double taxation results because of Ecuador's
acceptance of the apportionment notion, it may be as much due to
the inaccuracy of the arm's length approach as to the overreaching
of the apportionment scheme.
In order to reduce the threat of double taxation under the ap-
portionment method, Ecuador could take several steps. First, it
might develop its own multi-nation tax compact and encourage
Andean Pact nations to consider joining.17 " This would establish a
uniform formula, and help to avoid double taxation resulting from
differing formulas. Second, Ecuador could use tax treaties as a
means of coordinating taxation with other jurisdictions so as to
avoid double taxation - something Ecuador does not now do even
under the arm's length approach. 75 Third, Ecuador could use ap-
portionment to set the level of taxation, while allowing corpora-
tions to petition tax authorities when threats of double taxation
arise. Tax authorities could then consider the merits of the case
and decide the case accordingly.
Ecuador's present economic situation would improve under
the apportionment method. Ecuador's manufacturing sector is
geared primarily for the internal market.77 Additionally, Ecuador
is a net importer of wheat and livestock. 77 Thus, arm's length ap-
171. OECDTRANSFER PRICING, supra note 135, at 15.
172. This is analogous to the situation in Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159.
173. Indeed, the United States uses apportionment in a number of cases in which for-
mal accounting fails to produce an appropriate allocation. This is the "residual" method
under I.R.C. § 482 (1988). Internationally, apportionment is accepted and used in shipping
and air transport.
174. S. PLASSCHAERT, supra note 15, at 14 (advocating regional harmonization).
175. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.




proaches, which are useful in these areas, would be put to little use
in regulating exports. However, Ecuador's big export is oil.1"8
While notional prices are useful with such a commodity, determin-
ing expenses for such things as know-how, exploration, and re-
search would be troublesome. Further, the complexities will be en-
hanced since multinationals such as Occidental, Belco, Esso/
Hispanoil, Conoco, British Petroleum and Texaco/Pecten currently
have contracts in Ecuador. Thus, a more certain and predictable
measure like apportionment might be preferred.
V. CONCLUSION
Transfer pricing abuse is an available tool for tax evasion.
There is a great potential for abuse which, if left unchecked, could
result in significant tax evasion. However, countries like Ecuador
need to consider the policy implications of exercising stricter con-
trol over transfer pricing. Ecuador has already taken a number of
steps to control transfer pricing abuse. What remains to be done is
to select an appropriate mechanism for improving Ecuador's cur-
rent system.
There are a number of approaches Ecuador could take to con-
trol transfer pricing abuse. Basically, the approaches fall into two
categories: those which use accounting principles to determine a
defensible transfer price based on the arm's length concept as a
means to allocate income, and those which use mathematical gen-
eralizations to allocate income. Each of these approaches has
faults. Thus, selection becomes a process of weighing costs and
benefits.
The first option, determination of the "actual" transfer price,
is most successful when used for transactions in goods for which an
open market price exists. It is not as effective when dealing with
non-open market goods, services and intangibles. Its efficiency can
be enhanced, however, by using monitoring systems, audits, tax
treaties, and correlative price adjustments. Computation of a
transfer price will be very difficult under this approach and may
not be any more accurate than under other measures.
Another method to deter transfer pricing abuse is the taxation
of related party transfers. This works best for services and in-




problems surface as to what sales and services should be taxed if
they are provided overseas. Were Ecuador to tax overseas services
and sales, it might compromise the progress which it has already
made. Thus, this method is probably not the one best suited for
Ecuador.
A third method limits the deductibility of expenses. Yet this
method, too, is faulted for not allowing for legitimate deductions.
Since Ecuador's last two administrations have been attempting to
make Ecuador a better place for investment, this would be a step
backwards.
Artificial restraints are a fourth option. Under this system,
certain expenses may not be charged by a parent to its subsidiary.
Argentina's ban on payments for the use of trademarks is an exam-
ple of an artifical restraint. This approach also discourages busi-
ness by disallowing legitimate related party expenses. Thus, this
approach should not be used in the case of Ecuador, which, unlike
the larger and more economically developed Argentina, cannot af-
ford to discourage investment.
Notional prices are a fifth option. These can be used only with
primary products for which an open market price exists. They are
not very useful when dealing with vertically integrated firms, such
as Ecuador has in its area of primary export - oil. Thus, this
method would be of limited value to Ecuador.
The sixth and seventh options differ from the previous five in
that they break away from trying to establish an arm's length
price. The sixth method calls for an Ecuadorian tax on worldwide
income with the granting of tax credits for tax paid to other juris-
dictions. Unfortunately, this sort of system is not popular interna-
tionally and would deprive companies of the benefit of investment
in countries which grant tax holidays to encourage investment.
The final method, and the method this author most favors, is
the apportionment method. Under this method, Ecuador would tax
a unitary corporation on its worldwide income. Using an appor-
tionment formula, Ecuador could estimate what portion of the uni-
tary corporation's profits were Ecuadorian source income. This sys-
tem is predictable and easy to administer. Further, it involves no
messy attempts to determine the elusive defensible transfer price.
Thus, this is the method recommended for Ecuador's use. It
should be noted that apportionment may be useful even if it is not
chosen as the primary method for Ecuador. It can be used as a
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proxy to establish that which more formal accounting methods
should produce. 119
If Ecuador combines these suggestions with the other eco-
nomic liberalization steps which it is already in the process of im-
plementing, it should be able to cut back on the transfer pricing
abuse which is now occurring. Further, it will avoid the perception
of anomalous, discretionary results. Investors will perceive the new
scheme as a reduction in the bureaucracy involved in the invest-
ment process. In short, as Ecuador moves from subjective to objec-
tive criteria in its taxation, investors will find it easier to comply
with the law while the government will find it easier to enforce.
179. OECD/TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 136, at 15.
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